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Abstract Biomedical research involving human subjects
is an arena of conflicts of interests. One of the most
important conflicts is between interests of participants and
interests of future patients. Legal regulations and ethical
guidelines are instruments designed to help find a fair
balance between risks and burdens taken by research sub-
jects and development of knowledge and new treatment.
There is an universally accepted ethical principle, which
states that it is not ethically allowed to sacrifice individual
interests for the sake of society and science. This is the
principle of precedence of individual. But there is a prob-
lem with how to interpret the principle of precedence of
individual in the context of research without prospect of
future benefit involving children. There are proposals try-
ing to reconcile non-beneficial research involving children
with the concept of the best interests. We assert that this
reconciliation is flawed and propose an interpretation of the
principle of precedence of individual as follows: not all,
but only the most important interests of participants, must
be guaranteed; this principle should be interpreted as the
secure participant standard. In consequence, the issue of
permissible risk ceiling becomes ethically crucial in
research with incompetent subjects.
Keywords Best interests standard  Children  Non-
therapeutic research  Pediatric research  Precedence of
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Background
Biomedical research involving children is still a debated
issue. Since the Nuremberg Code, which made voluntary
informed consent of a competent participant a necessary
condition of medical research, the general approach in
national and international policies and ethical guidelines
has changed significantly. A number of different aspects of
research with children subjects have been discussed
extensively. The first step in changing attitudes towards
such research was almost universal acceptance of the
conviction that participation in biomedical research not
only poses risk, but it can sometimes also be beneficial to
participants. The next step was the recognition of the
importance of evidence based medicine. The main pre-
mises here are that only evidence based medicine can be
really and consistently beneficial and that no population
should become therapeutically orphaned and left without
safe and proven therapies (Ross 2004). Consequently, the
involvement of children in biomedical research was justi-
fied by two important principles of medical ethics: benef-
icence and justice. References to these principles can be
found in many regulations and guidelines. The Explanatory
Report to the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the
Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on
Human Rights and Biomedicine—(Oviedo Convention)
explicitly says that banning such research would stop
development of science and deprive groups of incompetent
people from the benefits of progress in medicine (Council
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of Europe 1997a). Similar explanation is found in the
report issued by the National Commission for the Protec-
tion of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral
Research, Research Involving Children. This report points
out that prohibition of participation of children in bio-
medical research would be unjust, because the fruits of the
progress in medicine would be available to adults but not to
children (National Commission 1977). In commentary on
CIOMS Guideline 14, it is stated that participation of
children is a necessary condition for progress in research
into diseases and conditions to which children are sus-
ceptible (Council for International Organizations of Med-
ical Sciences 2002). The same reason is given by
regulations and recommendations that support research
with children. Recent regulations in the US and the EU
support research involving children by promising sub-
stantial incentives for the pharmaceutical industry. In the
EU, pharmaceutical companies are obliged to present a
Paediatric Investigational Plan, which is thought to
influence research and development of medicinal products
for pediatric use (European Commission 2006). These
regulations are deemed to stimulate pharmaceutical
industry. European agencies are becoming involved in the
process of development of new treatments for children.
Recently, the European Medicines Agency issued a 5-year
Report to the European Commission that shows the results
of implemented Pediatric Regulation (European Medicines
Agency, Paediatric Committee 2012). Also the European
Commission published a report to the European Parliament
and the European Council. This is a report on experience
acquired as a result of the application of Paediatric Regu-
lation, and it shows that development of pediatric drugs has
become one of the important issues of European politics
(European Commission 2013). Although there are common
regulations within the European Union, there are still
important differences between laws of particular member-
states. The Clinical Trials Directive does not determine all
aspects of research with minors. For instance, it does not
provide the definition of ‘minor’. Besides that its scope is
limited to the area of clinical trials. Therefore, the Direc-
tive does not regulate other kinds of medical and other
research involving children (European Parliament, Council
of the European Union 2001). Thus, in some EU members’
research, which are not clinical trials, are not regulated by
legislation, for instance in Ireland (Sheikh 2008). In others,
like in Belgium, all types of research is regulated by the
law (Pinxten et al. 2008). Another issue is that some EU
members follow solely the Directive. Other EU members
either ratified or implemented standards proposed by the
Oviedo Convention and its protocols (Gevers 2008).
Oviedo Convention is a document issued by the Council of
Europe, an organization of all European and some non-
European countries that aims at cooperation and promoting
democracy and human rights. These two documents,
namely the Directive and Oviedo Convention, differ in
some important aspects, for instance in risk–benefit ratio
and in respecting minor’s dissent. Moreover, the systems of
ethical assessment of research widely differ in all states of
the EU (Kenter and Cohen 2012). The Directive was
deemed to be the cause of the decrease in clinical trials in
the EU, and increase in their costs. In 2016 it will be
replaced by the new Regulation (European Commission
2012). But the new Regulation will not significantly change
the situation of research with minors and incapacitated
patients. Also it will not unify the system of ethical
assessment. Some even expressed a regret that the Regu-
lation will not unify the system and might even contribute
to decrease of its quality (Heringa and Dute 2013; Wali-
gora 2013; Westra et al. 2014).
Empirical research conducted in some European coun-
tries shows law in some cases might be flexibly applied.
For instance, in the Netherlands promising research with-
out prospect of direct benefit, posing more than minimal
risk, was in some cases considered acceptable (Westra
et al. 2010). However Dutch law allows non-beneficial
research with incompetent subjects only, when it posed
negligible risk and minimal burdens (Westra et al. 2010;
Kenter 2008). Also in Germany, which seems to be one of
the most conservative countries in the EU in regards to
non-beneficial research, Research Ethics Committees
(RECs) chair-persons significantly vary in their attitudes
towards non-therapeutic research (Lenk et al. 2004). Also
in the US there are doubts about some aspects involving
incompetent subjects in research. There is still discussion
on what counts as direct and indirect benefits of research
(Friedman et al. 2012; Joffe et al. 2006), what is a proper
definition of research (Kass et al. 2013), and what limits of
risk could be acceptable in non-beneficial research (Wen-
dler 2013).
The precedence of the individual in regulations
The principle of precedence of individual interest has dif-
ferent formulations in many international regulations. All
versions of the Declaration of Helsinki quote phrases from
the Declaration of Geneva, saying that ‘‘The health of my
patient will be my first consideration’’ and the International
Code of Medical Ethics claiming that ‘‘A physician shall
act in the patient’s best interest when providing medical
care’’ (World Medical Association 2008; 1964; 1996;
2013; 2000). The 1968 version did not go further than these
introductory statements. In the 1975 version, Paragraph 5
of ‘‘Basic principles’’ declares that ‘‘Concern for the
interests of the subject must always prevail over the interest
of science and society’’ (World Medical Association 1975).
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In Section 3 of that version of the Declaration, devoted to
non-therapeutic biomedical research, Paragraph 4 states
‘‘In research on man, the interest of science and society
should never take precedence over considerations related to
the well-being of the subject’’ (World Medical Association
1975). Subsequent versions have the same wording; new
formulations appear in the 2000 and 2008 versions (World
Medical Association 2000; 2008). Finally, the current
version of the 2013 Helsinki Declaration states ‘‘While the
primary purpose of medical research is to generate new
knowledge, this goal can never take precedence over the
rights and interests of individual subjects’’ (World Medical
Association 2013).
The second Article of the Oviedo Convention explicitly
states that ‘‘the interests and welfare of the human being
shall prevail over the sole interest of society or science’’
(Council of Europe 1997a). The Explanatory Report to the
Oviedo Convention explains that in conflict of interests in
principle, the interests of the individual must take prece-
dence over the ‘‘sole’’ interests of science and society. The
Additional protocol concerning biomedical research and its
Explanatory Report contains the same provisions and
clarifications. Generally, the Convention is ‘‘inspired by
the principle of the primacy of the human being’’ (Council
of Europe 1997b). Article 17 of the Convention states that
non-beneficial research involving incompetent persons can
be conducted in exceptional circumstances. However, non-
beneficial research is thought to pose a serious risk of
instrumentalization/exploitation of individuals and vulner-
able groups. There is an inner tension between different
provisions of the Oviedo Convention. The authors of the
Convention realized that non-beneficial research might
infringe upon interests of incompetent participants. Such
research is inconsistent with the principle of the primacy of
the human being. Nevertheless, they decided not to ban it.
Non-beneficial research is allowed, but only in exceptional
circumstances and ‘‘on certain strict conditions’’. However,
in Germany, for instance, acceptability of this research in
the Convention was a reason not to ratify it (Stuhlinger
et al. 2009; de Wachter 1997) (Table 1).
A similar wording to the Oviedo Convention can be
found in the Ethical Considerations for Clinical Trials on
Medicinal Products conducted with the Paediatric Popula-
tion. These were published by an Ad hoc group for the
development of implementing guidelines for Directive
2001/20/EC. Section 11 states: ‘‘The child’s interest should
always prevail over that of science and society. This is
paramount when assessing and monitoring risk. Risk is to
be viewed in balance to the benefit’’ (Ad hoc committee
2006). The Directive states: ‘‘the interests of the patient
always prevail over those of science and society.’’ It is
interesting to note that this principle appears in the
Directive twice in the context of research involving
children (Article 4, par. i) and research with incapacitated
adults not able to give informed legal consent (Article 5,
par. h). The new Regulation moves the principle of pre-
cedence to the article (Article 29) containing the general
rules. CIOMS Guidelines do not explicitly contain the
principle of precedence of the individual, although this
requirement is referred to at least twice in the commen-
taries. Firstly, it is mentioned in the commentary to
Guideline 8 that concerns benefits and risk of participation
in research, where the Declaration of Helsinki is quoted.
Next, it is invoked in the commentary to Guideline 14,
which states that a parent might withdraw his or her child
from participation in clinical trials when it is not in the
child’s best interests (Council for International
Table 1 Formulations of the principle of precedence of individual
interests
Ethical guideline Year Formulation
Oviedo Convention 1998 Article 2
‘‘The interests and welfare of
the human being shall
prevail over the sole interest
of society or science’’
Directive 2001/20/EC 2001 Article 4, par. i, and Article 5,
par. h
‘‘The interests of the patient





2005 Article 3, par. 2.
‘‘The interests and welfare of
the individual should have
priority over the sole
interests of science or
society’’
Ethical Considerations for




‘‘The child’s interest should
always prevail over that of
science and society. This is
paramount when assessing
and monitoring risk. Risk is
to be viewed in balance to
the benefit’’
Regulation of the European
Parliament and of the
Council on clinical trials on
medicinal products for
human use, and repealing
the Directive 2001/20/EC
2012 Article 28, par. 2.
‘‘The rights, safety and well-
being of the subjects shall
prevail over the interests of
science and society’’
Declaration of Helsinki 2013 Section I, Paragraph 8
‘‘While the primary purpose
of medical research is to
generate new knowledge
this goal can never take
precedence of the rights and
interests of individual
subjects’’
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Organizations of Medical Sciences 2002). Also the Uni-
versal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights issued
by UNESCO contains the principle of precedence of
individual (Article 3, par. 2) worded as follows: ‘‘The
interests and welfare of the individual should have priority
over the sole interests of science or society’’. The Universal
Declaration seems to reconcile non-beneficial research
with incompetent persons with the best interests of par-
ticipants. Article 7, point a reads ‘‘authorization for
research and medical practice should be obtained in
accordance with the best interest of the person concerned’’
and in point b states that ‘‘research should only be carried
out for his or her direct health benefit, subject to the
authorization and the protective conditions prescribed by
law, and if there is no research alternative of comparable
effectiveness with research participants able to consent.
Research which does not have potential direct health ben-
efit should only be undertaken by way of exception, with
the utmost restraint, exposing the person only to a minimal
risk and minimal burden and if the research is expected to
contribute to the health benefit of other persons in the same
category, subject to the conditions prescribed by law and
compatible with the protection of the individual’s human
rights’’ (UNESCO 2005).
Research involving children and exploitation
The principle of precedence of individual interests can be
interpreted in two ways. First, the strong interpretation
would bind this principle with the best interests standard.
The weaker interpretation would imply only the secure
participant standard. The term ‘‘the secure participant
standard’’ is an adapted version of ‘‘the secure child stan-
dard’’ proposed recently by Sarah Shah (2013). According
to the strong interpretation, research is unethical if it is not
in the participant’s best interests. The weak interpretation
says only that research should not expose a participant to
undue, serious risk. The latter proposal sets a certain ceil-
ing of risk, the former sets a requirement of either positive
or at least neutral balance of risks and benefits for the
individual participant. Therefore, it seems clear why
research without prospects of benefit becomes a focal
point. If non-beneficial research with children might be
reconciled with the best interests standard, the precedence
of the individual interests principle can be understood in
accordance with the strong interpretation. However, if non-
beneficial research might not be reconciled with the best
interests standard, it means that if we still want to agree
that such research can be acceptable, the principle should
be interpreted in the weaker way.
Some argue that in non-beneficial research incompetent
patients are used, instrumentalized or even exploited
(Johansson and Brostrom 2012). Although one may argue
that if non-beneficial research associated with minimal risk
brings some benefits to peers of participants, this is not a
case of exploitation. But as Johansson and Brostrom realize
this is not the case when one group exploits another group.
Rather this is a case when one group (future pediatric
patients) takes advantage of individuals who do not benefit
from research, although they face risk and bear the burden
of participation. If non-beneficial research cannot be rec-
onciled with the best interests standard, it would be justi-
fied to think that participants are exploited. However it
does not mean that some degree of exploitation cannot be
ethically justified in some cases.
Usually exploitation is defined as taking unfair advan-
tage of someone for one’s benefit (Resnik 2003; Macklin
2004; Wertheimer 1996). Unfair transaction between A and
B might occur, when A harms, or disrespects or acts
unjustly toward B (Resnik 2003). Exploitation has different
degrees and in some cases a certain degree of exploitation
might be morally justified (Resnik 2003). For instance we
justify some degree of exploitation in the free market to
promote social good. We accept that partners may agree to
unjust shares in a company. It seems that also non-bene-
ficial research involving children is this kind of justifiable
exploitation. Resnik claims that in the case of non-benefi-
cial research, the key issue is the level of harm to a par-
ticipant that can be justified by the benefits to society
(Resnik 2003). If non-beneficial research cannot be rec-
onciled with the best interests standard, the crucial ethical
question is an acceptable risk ceiling. Therefore discussion
about protection of incompetent subjects should focus on
this problem. Moreover as Johansson and Brostrom point
out (Johansson and Brostrom 2012), we should be aware
that we exploit incompetent subjects in non-beneficial
research. This fact should not be hidden by idealistic lan-
guage. This is because only by being aware of this fact we
can properly assess balance between risk and burden and
expected benefits for incompetents as a group.
Regulations on minimal risk
For purposes of argument, we assume that non-beneficial
research with incompetent subjects is morally justified and
needed. Non-beneficial research is also approved in quoted
regulations, although there is not one standard of risk. For
instance the Oviedo Convention requires that non-benefi-
cial research be associated only with minimal risk and
burden. According to the Additional Protocol, risk and
burden cannot be increased, even if research might promise
increase of some additional benefit. Risk and burden are
understood in a nonrelative way (Article 17). Risk is con-
sidered to be minimal when ‘‘having regard to the nature
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and scale of the intervention, it is to be expected that it will
result, at most, in a very slight and temporary negative
impact on the health of the person concerned.’’ Minimal
burden is defined as temporary and very slight discomfort
(Council of Europe 2005). The Declaration of Helsinki also
requires minimal risk and burden (Article 28), but does not
provide interpretation of this concept (World Medical
Association 2013). The Directive as well as the new Reg-
ulation do not distinguish between beneficial and non-
beneficial research. They both require benefit for the group
and minimizing risk and burden ‘‘in relation to the disease
and developmental stage’’ (Article 4, par. g; Article 30,
par. g) (European Parliament, Council of the European
Union 2001; European Commission 2012). But the new
Regulation limits the risk and burden of research to the
minimal in clinical trials in emergency situations (Article
32, par. e) (European Commission 2012). These concepts
are not defined. Ethical considerations (12.1) in non-ben-
eficial research allows for minimal risk or minor increase
over minimal risk, when research is associated with benefit
for the group and benefit-risk balance is ‘‘at least as
favorable as that of available alternative approaches’’ (Ad
hoc committee 2006). Minimal risk is defined as risk not
greater than encountered in daily life or during perfor-
mance of physical or psychological test. Appendix to the
Ethical considerations gives examples of such defined risk
and burden. The UNESCO Universal Declaration allows
only minimal risk and minimal burden, but does not pro-
vide either definition of these categories or examples of
procedures.
This overview shows that although all regulations refer
to the principle of the precedence of individual, they
interpret it differently. According to the Directive and the
new Regulation, the principle can be reconciled with
minimizing risk and burden. According to the Oviedo
Convention, Universal Declaration, CIOMS Guidelines
and Declaration of Helsinki, the principle of precedence of
individual can be reconciled with research posing minimal
risk and burden. Finally, according to Ethical consider-
ations, this principle can be reconciled with research pos-
ing minor increase over minimal risk. Also only the Oviedo
Convention and Ethical considerations give quite clear
interpretation of risk. It seems that at least in the EU some
compromise and unified standard is possible.
The principle of precedence of individual interests
and the best interests standard
The best interests standard in the context of health was an
object of criticism both in medical and legal contexts. It
was argued that this is an open-ended, indeterminate and
speculative concept. Also, it was accused of being vague,
unknowable and unrealistic. Other arguments indicate that
the best interests standard is not a helpful tool, because if
one wants to resolve a conflict of interests between many
different parties, it does not answer whose best interests
should be considered (Archard 2013; Elliston 2007).
Recently, nevertheless, the best interests standard received
strong support from Loretta Kopelman (1997a, b, 2002,
2007, 2012) and there were some attempts to reconcile this
concept with non-beneficial research (Litton 2008). We do
not want to discuss or revise the best interest standard, as
Kopelman does it—the main issue here is to formulate the
proper interpretation of the principle of precedence of
individual that can be reconciled with research without
prospect of future benefit involving incompetent subjects.
For that purpose, the two different standards are distin-
guished. Both the best interest standard and the secure
participant standard determine different limits of moral
obligation towards children. According to the best interest
standard, health interests of incompetent persons cannot be
sacrificed for the purpose of research in interests of other
parties. In other words, according to the best interests
standard, a child might participate in biomedical research
only when it does not endanger her interests. The secure
participant standard allows for compromising such child’s
interests, but only to a certain point—for instance within
the limits of minimal risk or minor increase over minimal
risk.
Proper understanding of the best interest standard
If a research participant gives her informed consent for
participation, she is thought to act in her own best interest.
Her interest is understood here more broadly than only in
medical terms. Beliefs and preferences of the autonomous
person are the grounds constituting her best interests
(Berger 2011). But in the case of non-beneficial research
involving incompetent subjects, an important question
arises. The best interests of a non-autonomous person are
usually defined in medical terms (Berger 2011). It does not
mean that opinions and beliefs of incompetent persons do
not matter. On the contrary, they have significance. It is
universally recognized that a researcher should seek the
incompetent participant’s assent and respect her dissent
(Waligora et al. 2014). Participation needs authorization of
a legal representative. Participation in non-beneficial
research brings no clinical benefit for the subjects involved,
but it still is normally associated with non-zero risk and
burden. However, there are some proposals how to rec-
oncile participation in non-beneficial research with the best
interests standard.
L. M. Kopelman gives an interesting analysis using the
best interests standard in policy and decision-making
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involving incompetent persons (Kopelman 2007, 1997a).
According to Kopelman, the best interests standard can be
understood in a threefold manner. Firstly, it can be con-
ceived as a threshold for intervention and judgment. In this
case, the best interests standard consists in establishing the
minimum acceptable standard of care that must be fulfilled.
In the case when parents’ decisions endanger the well-
being of a child, a court might try to find the most rea-
sonable way of action in those circumstances. Secondly,
the best interests standard can be understood as an ideal
that directs guardians and policy makers in decision-mak-
ing processes towards promoting the wellbeing of those
incapacitated and establishing prima facie duties to them.
In this sense, the best interests standard might be helpful in
clarifying duties and in balancing different interests.
Finally, the best interests standard might be understood as a
standard of reasonableness. As such, it can also be used in
custody decisions and medical decisions. It does not imply
that others’ interests can be neglected, but it helps to find
the best solution in a certain situation: the best solution for
a child’s well-being in the physical and psychological
sense. As Kopelman writes, the best interests standard in
this, third, sense might be considered as instruction to
choose that option that would be chosen by the most
informed rational person of good will. This option would
maximize the child’s benefits and minimize child’s harm
and at the same time would also take into consideration the
rights, needs and interests of other people. This analysis
spreads the sense that is usually attached to the concept of
the best interests standards. The first concept analyzed by
Kopelman should be rather called a minimal interest
standard and it is probably the closest concept to the secure
participant standard. This standard does not refer to what
exactly is a child’s due, but rather to what extent the child’s
needs and interest can be compromised. Moreover this
concept is derived from the second understanding of the
best interests given by Kopelman. One has to establish the
child’s needs and interests in the ideal situation, and then
try to determine to what extent these needs and interest can
be compromised. Kopelman prefers to use the term the best
interest standard probably to be in accordance with legal
tradition and terminology, not because of the content of the
concept itself.
Reconciliation between the best interests standard
and non-beneficial research?
Kopelman also draws a line of possible argumentation,
pointing out that the policy introducing the best interests
standard as a threshold for parental authority is more
beneficial for all children than a lack of such a policy. This
line of argumentation might be developed to reconcile non-
beneficial research and the best interests standard. A policy
that allows for non-beneficial research with children is
generally more beneficial for every individual child than a
policy banning such research. In society, where a policy
allowing non-beneficial research exists, every child is
better off, because she benefits from scientific development
more than a child in a society where benefits of develop-
ment of medicine are mainly confined to the adult popu-
lation. Litton is convinced that his statement to the effect
that the best interests standard is reconcilable with the
policy for allowing non-beneficial research has empirical
character (Litton 2008).
This argument assumes that not all regulations that
allow non-beneficial research involving children would be
beneficial to every child, even those who are participating
in studies that expose them to some level of risk. For
example, it might seem that a policy that sets a ceiling of
risk for non-beneficial research would be more beneficial
than a policy which does not set any limit of risk. A policy
that does not set a risk ceiling might be in accordance with
utilitarian calculus beneficial for the whole population, but
not beneficial for participants who would be exposed to
very high risks. Following this line of argumentation, such
policy should be rejected and a policy that sets a certain
risk ceiling established—the policy which is beneficial for
both every individual child and children as a group—it is
debatable what exactly this risk ceiling should be.
It is sometimes argued that non-beneficial research
involving subjects who cannot give informed consent
entails exploitation of participants. A participating indi-
vidual, if she does not benefit from the research, is treated
merely as a means to produce good for others. However,
Litton’s approach points at a broader context of biomedical
research and thereby allows to invert this argument. If a
policy allowing non-beneficial research is beneficial to
every individual child, a principled refusal to let a child
participate in research rather entails treating other children
merely as means towards one’s ends (Litton 2008). It
implies that if the policy allowing research is beneficial to
both all children and every participant in particular, a
person, who does not want to follow the policy without
sufficient reason and in principle refuses to be involved in
research, is a free-rider, who benefits from the fact that
others do participate. Therefore, he or she treats others only
as means to his or her own goals.
This argument nevertheless is fragile to objections (Shah
2013). There are children who remain relatively healthy
throughout their childhood and who do not need new
therapies. For them, the policy allowing non-beneficial
research is not beneficial. Moreover, this policy may
expose them to risk that is greater than they would be
exposed to if there were no such policy. Besides that, some
children are likely to be exposed to a very small risk of
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death as a consequence of being involved in biomedical
research. Sarah Shah argues that the risk of death as a
consequence of participation in medical research is similar
to the risks associated with being treated for a disease that
child might contract. That argument would be difficult to
make after the child’s death (Shah 2013). Summing up, we
state that Litton has successfully argued that it is not fair to
principally refuse participation in activity that brings one
some profits even if it might be associated with some risk.
Nevertheless, this argument does not reconcile the indi-
vidual’s best interests with non-beneficial research.
The objective good and the best interests
There is an alternative to reconciling the best interests
standard with acceptability of non-beneficial research.
According to David Wendler, some individuals might later
in life finally come to understand and embrace their con-
tribution to the development of science when they were
children and that this can become a part of their biography
and make their lives better. Therefore, it can be concluded
that involvement in non-beneficial research can promote
individual interests (Wendler 2012). Wendler’s argument
hinges on two premises. The first is that enrolling a child
into a clinical trial might be consistent with her clinical
interests ex ante (before the event), by which he means that
a study eventually can turn out to be harmful or non-ben-
eficial, but before its launch it could present acceptable
risk/benefit ratio. The second says that individual interests
can be understood not only in terms of pleasure, and sat-
isfaction of preferences, but also objectively. It means that
something can influence one’s life, making it better or
worse, even though it has nothing to do with pleasures or
current preferences. To illustrate this kind of good, Wen-
dler gives an example of a 2-year-old child accidentally
and innocently killing a friend. Such event—even if it does
not affect a child in terms of pain or compromising pref-
erences, may nevertheless influence her life and by
becoming a part of one’s life’s narrative, would make it
worse. Then Wendler argues that involvement in non-
beneficial research might be embraced by a formerly
incompetent participant as important, but also it might
make her life better in the objective sense, even if one does
not even think that one has done something objectively
praiseful.
Wendler tries to refute possible objections and he claims
that even if it turns out that a former participant rejected
and dismissed her participation and contribution, it would
not mean that risk/benefit ratio of participation had been
unfair ex ante (before the event). Kopelman aptly realizes
that, at this point, there are no data indicating how many
former subjects benefit in a way described by Wendler
(Kopelman 2012). These data are needed to estimate the
exact risk/benefit ratio. One can say that Wendler has in
mind the objectively understood interest of an individual
and it does not matter, if one is capable to embrace it or
not. Therefore, Kopleman’s demand for research would be
a misunderstanding. But the very concept of the objective
interests is quite controversial. One can take a stand that
there is nothing like objective value. All values are rela-
tional entities. Therefore, it is not true that a participant’s
life is better, even when she dismisses her involvement. In
this situation, there are only some people who perceive her
life as more meaningful and better. Thus it can be said that
the participant’s recognition of her involvement in medical
research is crucial in regards to her best interests. And, as a
consequence, the argument does not extend to include all
incompetent subjects. For example, it does not work for
persons permanently incapacitated by dementia who did
not leave any testimonies expressing their preferences
concerning participation in research. The same might be
said about young children who, due to serious diseases,
never reach a certain stage of cognitive development. For
these people, there will not be a moment in which they
relate themselves to the research in which they partici-
pated. Therefore, participation in its moral sense would not
be in their interest. In addition, their best interest should be
defined rather in biological than in moral terms. Moreover,
as Linus Broström and Mats Johansson point out, this
argument relies on the mere possibility of benefiting from
research (Brostrom and Johansson 2014).
The secure participant standard
Kopelman gives the following example. Parents want to
enroll their 3-year-old child in an endocrinology trial
(Kopelman 2007). The trial is not meant to bring any direct
benefit to the child and requires a 2-day stay in a hospital
and several injections. The parents’ decision of involve-
ment of their child into this study, according to Kopelman,
would not meet the best interests standard understood as a
threshold—parents would not ensure their child’s safety
and they would expose her to risk that is too high. How-
ever, society allows parents to engage their children in
many risky activities, for instance sports (football, karate
and skiing). It is assumed that parents usually take care of
children’s interests, but parental authority is not a logical
derivative from the concept of the child’s best interests
(Downie and Randall 1997). Parenting is a value in itself
and parental powers stem from the rights to privacy and
intimate relationships (Downie and Randall 1997). These
rights can be limited only if parents endanger the well-
being of their child in a socially unacceptable manner. In
this example, although Kopelman invokes the concept of
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the best interests, she conceives it as a limitation of risks.
Parents are not entitled to put their children at too serious a
risk. But this formulation should be called rather a secure
participant standard instead of the best interests standard,
because parental decision in this case is not considered
unacceptable, simply because it does not promote the
child’s best interests. It was probably even not intended to
promote them. It exposed a child to undue risk.
The ‘‘secure child standard’’ was proposed by Sarah
Shah (2013). This standard might be nevertheless extended
to all incompetent research participants. The secure par-
ticipant standard allows the incompetent to be involved in
different non-zero risk procedures, if the risk is justified.
The best interests standard is especially difficult to apply in
the context of biomedical research, because the main goal
of research is to produce generalizable knowledge, not
individual benefits and it is not meant to promote indi-
vidual interests. In non-beneficial research involving
incompetent subjects, individual risk and discomfort is
weighed against development of science and the prospect
of benefits for the future patients. The main concern,
therefore, is not the promoting of the participants’ well-
being, but rather checking if her well-being is not endan-
gered too much. The principle of the precedence of indi-
vidual interest has, therefore, one specific task: to protect a
participant from undue risk. The principle of precedence of
the individual was established to stop exclusively utilitar-
ian logic, and in this sense it has deontological elements.
This principle is used to stop aggregation of the rights and
interests of society and science to outweigh important
interests and rights of individual participants (Pattinson
2012). The deontological approach does not inevitably
entail prohibition of balancing different interests, and, in
particular, weighing interests of the individual against
interests of society. If participation in biomedical research
does not endanger significant interests of subjects, then it
can be considered justified exploitation. Then the main task
here will be to set up a limit of risk that a participant can be
exposed to without being unjustifiably exploited. It seems
there is still not a compromise in the EU about risk
requirements in non-beneficial research involving incom-
petent subjects.
Conclusion
We propose that there is no sufficient argument yet that
proves non-beneficial research can ever be in the best
interests of incompetent participants. It is rather otherwise:
in non-beneficial research with non-zero risks, important
interests of incompetent subjects are sacrificed for the good
of others and science (Johansson and Brostrom 2012;
Brostrom and Johansson 2014). Ethical guidelines and
regulations should not veil this very fact and cover it with
hypocritical language. Hypocrisy might be understood as
lack of moral seriousness and significant demand for ethical
documents is to be morally serious (Crisp and Cowton
1994). Moreover, the strong interpretation of the principle
of the precedence of the individual would be inconsistent
with the part of regulations that allows non-beneficial
research to be conducted with children. Even if we accept
that it is sometimes morally acceptable to balance interests
of children and interests of society and future patients, it
would be wrong to apply unrestricted utilitarian calculus
that can sometimes lead to unacceptable sacrifice of the
individual’s rights and interests for the sake of well-being of
the society. For this reason, regulations concerning bio-
medical research with children should protect their interests
and should not allow for exclusively utilitarian calculations.
In general terms, this limit could be expressed as the prin-
ciple of precedence of the individual (in proposed weak
interpretation) and it should take a form of requirement of
risk ceiling as a specific and operational provision.
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